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Challenges to the Patent System
By Giuseppina D’Agostino*

A

Introduction
One of the underlying justifications of the patent system is to encourage

dissemination of scientific knowledge and promote innovation.1 Yet, the patent
system is not a green card to innovation. Indeed, given our progress in science
and the increasing rate of technological developments it is ironic that there is
arguably a declining rate of innovation.2

From this perspective, it might be

contended that the patent system is not meeting its said objectives. But the
patent system should be seen in a wider context. While well-intended, it is far too
simplistic to argue that patents are good or bad for innovation, or that they „freeze
or spur‟ innovation.3 The challenges to the patent system are complex and

*

DPhil (Oxford); Member of the Bar of Ontario; Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law
School, York University, Canada. Thanks to the UK‟s former Strategic Advisory Board for
Intellectual Policy (SABIP) bringing together a top group of experts to review my article and to
Hashim Ghazi, Jonathan Giraldi, Nathan Fan, Nirav Bhatt and Essien Udokang for their research
assistance.
1
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), “R&D, Innovation and Patents”, online: WIPO
<http://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/developments/research.html>; Vincent J. Napoleon, “Impact of
Global Patent and Regulatory Reform on Patent Strategies for Biotechnology” (2008) 1 J. Tech.
L. & Pol‟y 3.
2
See generally, J. Huebner, “A Possible Declining Trend for Worldwide Innovation” (2005) 72
Technological Forecasting & Social Change 980 at 980-86; In Canada, see Council of Canadian
Academics, Innovation and Business Strategy: Why Canada Falls Short (Ottawa: Council of
Canadian Academics, June 2009), online: Council of Canadian Academics
<http://www.scienceadvice.ca/documents/(2009-06-11)%20Innovation%20Report.pdf>; See also
Mario Coccia, “Democratization is the detriment of technological change” (2008) CNR-Ceris
Working Paper No. 6, online: Conisglio Nazionale delle Richerche (CNR)-Ceris
<http://www.ceris.cnr.it/ceris/workingpaper/2008/WP_6_08_COCCIA.pdf>; In the pharmaceutical
industries drug attrition is a mounting problem: I. Kola & J. Landis, “Can the pharmaceutical
industry reduce attrition rates?” (2004) 3 Nature 711 [Kola & Landis].
3
F. Lévêsque & Y Ménière, “Patents and Innovation: Friends or Foes?” (December 2006) Centre
d‟économie industrielle Ecole Nationale Superieure des Mines de Paris at 3 [Lévêsque &
Ménière] (the title belies the multi-faceted study on various aspects of the patent system); R.
Thomas, “Debugging Software Patents: Increasing Innovation and Reducing Uncertainty in the
Judicial Design of Optimal Software Patent Law,” online: SSRN
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1114065>; S. O‟Connor, “IP Transactions as Facilitators of the
Globalized Innovation Economy” (Lecture delivered at Entrepreneurship, Innovation and

2
cannot solely be attributed to its laws. That is, the patent system‟s constituting
laws do not tell the full story. Often more telling are the institutional frameworks
and socio-cultural and economic practices at the pre-patent inventive stage and
the post-patent commercialization stage and beyond. And so when attempting to
predict future developments, and ultimately, craft solutions, understanding and
ensuring that the wider context is effective is paramount.
In order to anchor this discussion which explores the challenges in the
existing patent system and in the possible solutions, the institutional aspects of
the patent system, which play a material role alongside the law, will be examined.
For example, while technology has facilitated online filing, patent application
costs remain prohibitive. Technology could be used more effectively to minimize
these costs and equalize the playing field. At the same time, with the speed of
technological developments, patent examiners‟ knowledge often remains dated.
Here the peer-to-patent system being experimented in the UK, Japan, the US
and Australia is an attractive mechanism of galvanizing user-generated
communities to review patents and infuse fresh and accurate expertise in the
examination process. Ultimately, costs might be reduced as well as ensuring that
more robust patents are granted. Another opportunity to reshape the patent
administration process and to reduce transaction costs especially for poorer
applicants, such as independent inventors and universities is to consider a move
towards a global patent system, but it too is not without challenges.
Commercializing IP Conference at IP Osgoode and Hennick Centre for Business and Law, York
University, Toronto, February 11, 2010), publication pending in R. Dreyfuss et al, Working Within
the Boundaries of Intellectual Property (London: Oxford University Press, 2010) (argues that
while there are certainly some “bad” patents, IP is generally not a problem, but usefully allows
transactions to take place).
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B

Challenges in the Patent Context

1

IP Discourse: IP is good v IP is bad
Engaging in absolutist debates that IP is good or IP is bad, and

specifically, that patents are good or bad may hinder properly recalibrating the
patent system. And so, while not obvious, the dominant discourse surrounding
the patent system may present a “challenge” in itself to even beginning a healthy
conversation of patent challenges, and eventually, patent reform. Governments
may be reluctant to deploy resources to lost cause issues especially where they
may lose popularity and votes if they are seen to act in a fashion inconsistent
with either mantra. For instance, with the recent prospect of moving towards a
globally harmonized patent system, discussed later, the anti-IP camp may
challenge governments‟ willingness to work towards recalibrating the patent
system. Such anti-IP/patents-are-bad discourse draws in broad and diverse
criticisms, with many that strike at the very merits of patent protection.
Many of the commentators in the anti-IP camp have focused on the
negative IP system‟s effect on global society from ideological, philosophical and
sociological perspectives and in varying degrees.4 Such perspectives range from
gender study criticisms of a “hypermasculinized” IP system, to violations of
political and religious ideologies, to human rights concerns over the rights to
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its application to the right to health,
4

See generally R. Ghafele, “Perceptions of Intellectual Property: A review” online: Intellectual
Property Institute (August 2008), online: IP Institute
<http://www.ipinstitute.org.uk/pdfs/Perceptions%20of%20IP.pdf.> [Ghafele].
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food and self-determination.5 Many actors have also voiced their criticism of the
circumstances surrounding the formation of the TRIPs Agreement, arguing that
the forum of negotiation, the WTO, was designed to benefit big business and to
encourage a protectionist environment.6 Others further argue that because the
developing countries were ill-informed and lacked the capacity to represent
adequately their position on IP at the WTO, the result was a further entrenchment
of the disparity in the North-South divide.7
Significant criticism of patent systems has also been seen concerning
public health and access to medicines. Strongly driven by NGOs such as
Médicins Sans Frontières (MSF) and The Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
(OXFAM), the debate largely surrounds the impact of patents on the prices of
medicines and the accessibility by those in need, mostly found in developing
countries.8 Many campaigns have targeted the pharmaceutical industry
specifically, often depicting the industry‟s practice of patenting essential
medicines

as
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Ibid. at 4, 5.
R. Rikowski, “Tripping over TRIPS: An Assessment of the WTO‟s Agreement on TRIPs,
Focusing on Trade, Moral and Information Issues” (2003) 20 Business Information Review; see
generally R. Rikowski, “A Marxist Analysis of the World Trade Organisation‟s Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights” (2006) 4(4) Policy Futures in Education
396, online: Policy Futures in Education
<http://www.wwwords.co.uk/pdf/validate.asp?j=pfie&vol=4&issue=4&year=2006&article=7_Rikow
ski_PFIE_4_4_web>.
7
E. Su, “The Winners and the Losers: the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights and Its Effects on Developing Countries” (2000) 23 Houston Journal of
International Law 1.
8
Ghafele, supra note 4 at 14.
9
See O. Boateng, “The Profits that Kill”, New African (April 2001) 22-27 (summarized Oxfam and
The Guardian‟s “Dying For Drugs” series on the pharmaceutical industry, in which they accused
pharmaceutical companies of “systematically using patent rules to squeeze low-cost copies of
branded medicines off the market” and for “making too much money for the West” at the expense
of the poor in Africa).
6
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pharmaceutical industry‟s commoditization of patents and have questioned
whether it is acceptable to view medicines as a luxury. 10 Other criticism has
centered specifically on the rigidity of the TRIPS Agreement to facilitate access to
medicines in developing countries. Critics have argued that many developing
countries are still unable to take advantage of such flexibilities due to their lack of
technical and administrative capabilities and the “TRIPS-plus” provisions
contained in bilateral free trade agreements that have further diminished policy
options to protect public health.11 It is further argued that the current patent
incentive system leads to biomedical products that yield high profits rather than
global priority health needs in developing countries.12 For example, malaria,
pneumonia, diarrhea and TB account for 21% of the global disease burden, yet
only receive 0.31% of all public and private funds devoted to health research.
Further, over 1 billion people, mostly in the developing world, suffer from tropical
diseases which are absent or neglected in R&D.
The debate on IP has also been expanded to include a push for greater
access to innovation and scientific progress for the global public good. Critics of
the patent system have argued that the propertization and ownership of science
and technology inherent to the current system have serious drawbacks on the

10

M. Goozner, “Medicine as a Luxury: the West treats vital pharmaceuticals as just another
commodity. If poor countries can‟t afford filet, why should they get cheap drugs?” (2002) 13 The
American Prospect 1.
11
Report to the Strategic Advisory Board for Intellectual Property Policy (SABIP), Patents in the
Global Economy by Duncan N. Matthews, (London: Intellectual Property Office, 2010), online: <
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresearch-pglobal-201012.pdf >.
12
E.R. Gold et al, “Are Patents Impeding Medical Care Innovation?” (2010) 7 PLoS Med 1, at 3
[Gold].
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science commons and the general welfare of society. 13 Such a system also
raises ethical issues due to its limitations on access to benefits of research and
innovation, resulting in adverse effects on many populations. In what has been
described as the anti-commons of biomedical research, critics have argued that
the over-allocation of patents to biomedical research has resulted in valuable
knowledge remaining underexploited due to limitations of access.14 A notable
example of this effect is found with the human genome, where 20% of the genes
are held under U.S. patents, the majority of which are owned by the private
sector.15 Critics hold that the anti-commons effect results not only from the grant
of patent rights, but also from restrictive downstream licensing practices.
However, the debate on whether there exists an anti-commons tragedy of limited
access remains unresolved as empirical evidence continues to be ambiguous.16
While certainly not all such criticisms are unfounded, less rhetoric and
more evidence-based reasoning may be warranted in order to more sensibly
address the issues facing the patent system. Doing otherwise, and feeding the IP
is good, or as noted here, the IP is bad debate, may remain a roadblock to fruitful
changes in the years ahead. As will be explored more fully below, debunking the
very idea of patent protection, and in doing so across the board, is unhelpful and
unrealistic. A more nuanced, evidence-driven conversation would be salutary in
the academic, policy and legislative circles. And so, more time, resources and
13

L. Biron “The Rationale for Patents: A Philosophical Perspective”, at 7-10; see also The
University of Manchester Institute of Science, Ethics and Innovation, “Who Owns Science? The
Manchester Manifesto” online: The University of Manchester Institute for Science Ethics and
Innovation <http://www.isei.manchester.ac.uk/TheManchesterManifesto.pdf>.
14
Gold, supra note 12 at 2, 3; S. Piper, “The Tools and Levers of Access to Patented Health
Related Genetic invention in Canada” (2009) 30 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol‟y 43 at 43-77.
15
Ibid.
16
Gold, supra note 12.
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expertise should be allocated to study the issues from various perspectives. At
the same time, a critical lens should be cast when presented with any absolutist,
catch-all arguments.

2

Wider Context in a Sector-specific Approach
In light of the absolutist IP discourse that presents a challenge to fixing the

patent system in its own right, and the proposed need for greater evidence-driven
conversation, the many more challenges that exist are best understood at a
sector specific level. Not only have some commentators argued that some
patents merit differential treatment,17 other studies have suggested that they
merit different licensing solutions depending on the industry. Every industry is
unique and implicates a host of parties unique to its patent system. 18 Indeed, „…
downstream

commercialization

requires

coordination

among

the

many

complementary users of the patented invention, including, inter alia, developers,
manufacturers, laborers, managers, investors, advertisers, and marketers.‟19 In a
survey of 229 US and Canadian firms, only 4% of licensable technologies were
found to end up in a license.20 Of the 100 licensable technologies, a potential

17

B. Condon & T. Sinha, “Global Diseases, Global Patents and Differential Treatment in WTO
Law: Criteria for Suspending Patent Obligations in Developing Countries” (2005) 26(1) Nw. J. Int‟l
L. & Bus. 1 (discussing several WTO mechanisms for implementing special and differential
treatment in TRIPS with respect to pharmaceutical patents); K. Outterson, “Should Access to
Medicines and TRIPS flexibilities be limited to specific diseases” (2008) 34 Am. J.L & Med. 279.
18
Lévêsque & Ménière, supra note 3 at 74; P. Jenkins, “Intellectual Property Rights: Innovation
and Commercialization in Turbulent Times” (Lecture delivered at the Conference Board of
Canada, Sheraton Hotel, Toronto, 29 May 2009) [unpublished] (commentary of lecture available
online at IP Osgoode <http://www.iposgoode.ca/2009/06/conference-board-of-canada-eventhighlights-importance-of-ip-protections/>).
19
S.F. Kieff, “IP Transactions: On the Theory & Practice of Commercializing Innovation” (2005)
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 311, online: SSRN
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=821327>.
20
Lévêsque & Ménière, supra note 3 at 53.
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licensee is found in only 25 cases.21 Valuable patented technologies are often
unexploited. There are various reasons for this including disagreement of
royalties between parties, costs to search for potential partners, internal
approvals concerning exclusivity, opportunistic behaviour among firms where
partners may appropriate disclosed information without a licence. As a result,
firms that have existing relationships might engage more easily in licensing
agreements.22 Overall, the chances that a patent is successfully commercialized
and actually returns a profit are extremely low. But when there is commercial
success, the rewards can be high.23

3

Pharmaceutical and Biotech Industry
Take the pharmaceutical industry as a case in point. While pharmaceutical

patent right holders might argue that the patent protection term is too short,
irrespective of the time of protection allocated, pharmaceutical discoveries should
become more efficient. The issue is not purely a legal one. Current drug attrition
is quite high and even 100 years of patent protection would not solve
pharmaceutical woes.24 On the contrary, a prolonged term of protection might
disincentivize pharmaceutical industries from discovering new drugs. One vehicle
for generating new patentable drugs is for pharmaceuticals to partner with
universities

conducting

21

multidisciplinary

research

in

diverse

areas

as

Ibid. at 53.
Ibid. at 54.
23
Ibid. at 64.
24
Kola & Landis, supra note 2; I. Kola, “The State of Innovation in Drug Development” (February
2008) 83 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 227.
22
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nanotechnology, drug delivery, monoclonal antibodies and stem cells to name a
few.
Here the patent system might be improved in order to further promote
innovation in universities conducting drug research. For example, patents are
prohibitively expensive and universities do not have the resources for national
phase filing expenses, legal costs associated with translation between countries
and other costs. For instance, any applications filed pursuant to the European
Patent Office (EPO) must be written in one of the three official languages:
English, French and German. If accepted, patents must be translated in the other
two languages and in any country in which the innovators claim a patent. In the
result, a European patent activated in 7 countries costs 7,000 euros in
translations. Comparatively, a European patent costs on average 24,100 euros to
its holder, whereas a US patent 10,250 euros and a Japanese patent 5,460.25
Such fees are especially onerous for university-based applicants. Commentators
argue that the costs „should be incurred only if it is outweighed by a larger social
benefit in terms of information diffusion‟,26 alas one of the goals of the patent
system. But as Lévêsque and Ménière argue this is not the case for most
translations which are often unread and only available several years after the
patent issuance. Consequently, „[t]his delay is too long relatively to the path of
technological change.‟27

25

Lévêsque & Ménière, supra note 3 at 44.
Ibid.
27
Ibid.; In addition, several reform projects are underway, such as the Community Patent and the
London Protocol, to reduce the cost of translation of European patents in National languages.
26
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Budgetary restraints are particularly acute for patents associated with
pharmaceutical and biotechnology applications. One reason specific to these
industries is the need to generate pre-clinical data in order to attract an industrial
licensee. However, in vivo pre-clinical studies can take from months to years to
be completed, yet universities are often forced to file patent applications well in
advance in order to secure a priority date. Some may argue that universities
should postpone filing biomedical patent applications until after in vivo data is
generated, but academic researchers are faced with the predicament that they
must publish their data in order to secure a grant to conduct the required in vivo
experiments therefore forcing them to file prior to disclosure. Considering the
obstacles faced by university technology transfer, the patent system might be
adapted to promote innovation within cash strapped universities.

4

University Technology Transfer
While there are „deep pocket‟ university exceptions, the majority of

academic institutions can certainly file, but do not have the budget to maintain
patents.
Resources

are

scarce.

Universities

support

researchers

through

technology transfer offices and advise on how to best commercialize valuable IP.
Although these tech transfer offices are a critical resource, all too often
individuals with limited industrial experience are recruited. Of course there are
the exceptions, MaRS in Toronto is but one example, and in Canada the
“Waterloo miracle” is a success story which features a model “innovation
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ecosystem”.28 Launch Lab for the World is a new Canada-based industry-driven
initiative which will draw from various public-private fora, including university
know-how to launch the world‟s innovative technologies.29
Due to the limited financial resources, the current innovation model
developed in academic commercialization or knowledge-transfer centres is for
applicants to secure a licence within a year of filing. Often universities employ a
policy to file for a provisional but do not convert the application to the Patent
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) phase at one-year, unless a licensing deal is in place.
Such a policy results in numerous missed opportunities, especially in the
biomedical sciences. Inventors lose their inventions as they are not able to
commit to enter the national phase due to the inordinate expenses and lack of
support. This raises the concern that valuable patent applications are being
dropped too early. And here, it is significant to appreciate that there is no onesize fits all policy.
There are various solutions available to enable promising inventions to
make it to the national phase. First, university commercialization centres can
soften their pre-national phase licensing rules, or at least, allow biotechnological
inventions, often saddled with expensive and time-consuming in vivo trials, more
time to materialize viable clinical applications. A second solution, which I will
address below, might be to reform the patent administration process to reduce
28

S. Maich, “Why Canada Needs RIM to Win” Canadian Business Magazine (February 15, 2010)
4; M. Castel, “IP Transactions as Facilitators of the Globalized Innovation Economy” (Lecture
delivered at Entrepreneurship, Innovation and Commercializing IP Conference at IP Osgoode and
Hennick Centre for Business and Law, York University, Toronto, February 11, 2010)
[unpublished].
29
See Launch Lab for the World <www.launchlabfortheworld.com> (Launched at Canada 3.0
Conference, Stratford, Ontario by Tony Chapman, Founder & CEO of Capital C Communications,
10 & 11 May 1 2010).
D’Agostino December 19, 2011

12
transaction costs especially for poorer applicants, such as independent inventors
and universities by considering (1) a move towards a global patent system; (2)
relying

on

peer-to-patent

initiatives;

and,

(3)

implementing student-ran

commercialization clinics.

C

Challenges in the Solutions

1

A Move Towards a Global Patent System?
Commentators are divided on whether a global patent system is desirable.

Desirability is contingent on one‟s objectives for the patent system, and typically
on a global scale, differs depending on whether the perspective is from a
developed or developing nation.30

(a)

Benefits
A global patent system is generally believed to reduce transaction costs

(namely, filing fees and potential litigation). In the pharmaceutical and biotech
context, a global patent system could cut down on expenses to assist parties in
filing after pre-clinical studies. Commentators justify the need for a harmonized
patent system to aid the globalization of commerce, reduce trade barriers and
bolster stability and predictability in international patent protection.31 More
30

Though there are certainly exceptions, see E. Alsegård, “Global Pharmaceutical Patents after
the Doha Declaration: What Lies in the Future” (2004) 1(1) SCRIPTed 12, online: University of
Edinburgh, SCRIPTed <http: www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/docs/doha.asp> (argues for the
global protection of intellectual property rights for developing countries).
31
See e.g. R.R. Willis, “International Patent Law: Should United States and Foreign Patent Laws
Be Uniform? An Analysis of the Benefits, Problems, and Barriers” (2009) 10 N.C. J.L. & Tech.
283 at 300.
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specifically, the five most common arguments for patent harmonization include:
(1) reduction of patent costs by exchange of results between examining patent
offices; (2) reduction of problems and errors during the prosecution of patent
applications in foreign countries; (3) worldwide patent protection becomes
effective; (4) each step of harmonization leads to further harmonization; and (5)
further step-by-step harmonization may finally motivate the United States to give
up the principle of first to invent.32 Indeed, the United States has been reluctant
to change its domestic policies to align more with the international community,
notwithstanding its push for a more global system. The Patent Reform Act of
200933 represents the third consecutive congressional session to attempt the first
overhaul of the U.S. patent system since 1952 and among its various proposals,
switch from a first to invent to first to file system and make its domestic policy
more congruent with its international counterparts.34 From an access to justice
perspective, enforcement of patent suits would be more convenient and less
expensive. Indeed, a law allowing a patent holder to consolidate multiple
infringing acts in a single suit might not only save money but provide the only
means for the patent holder to obtain redress.35 Of course, here one would have

32

Ibid.
U.S., Patent Reform Act, 111th Cong. (2009) (Mar 3, 2009) at s. 515, online: GovTrack.us
<http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s111-515>.
34
Most countries operate on a first-to-file system. For commentary, see A. Sabatelli & J.C.
Rasser, “Impediments to Global Patent Law Harmonization” (1995) 22 N. Ky. L. Rev. 579; A.M.
Seifert, “Will the United States Take the Plunge into Global Patent Law Harmonization? A
Discussion of the United States‟ Past, Present, and Future Harmonization Efforts” (2002) 6 Marq.
Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 173; R.K. Dickey, “The First-to-Invent Patent Priority System: An
Embarrassment to the International Community” (2006) 24 B.U. Int‟l L.J. 283; H. Waters, “US
switch to first-to-file patents could cause minor shake-up” (2011) 17 Nature Medicine 906.
35
S. Fernandes, “Annual Review: Intellectual Property: Patent: Note: Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T: A
Welcome Return to Patent Law‟s Tradition of Territoriality” (2008) 23 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 75 at
100-1.
33
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to be a patent holder to begin with or have a claim to be protected, and be versed
with the litigation process in the first place.

(b)

Disadvantages
Typically the two most common sources of resistance are ideological and

economic. Ideologically, three reasons typically lead to opposing patent
harmonization: (1) reluctance of national governments to refashion their current
systems; (2) abdicating on some national sovereignty in favour of a global
system; and (3) reconciling various interests between the developing and
developed world.36 Economically, there is an inordinate cost to implement a
global patent system: to align the myriad domestic policies with an international
standard, account for the early expense of administration (notwithstanding the
future reduction in cost) and to determine a unified court system. As well, there is
a strong argument insisting that were there to be a global system, special and
distinct treatment would have to be carved out for unique entities, such as
developing nations and pharmaceutical/biotech industries. A global patent
system might also present potential for abuse by more powerful companies and
states, and would have to have a robust review mechanism in place.

(c)

Global Patent Points to Ponder
As nations are transforming from industrial-based to information-based

economies, protection of intellectual property will affect trade issues on a global

36

Ibid. at 301.
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scale and necessitate a more collaborative approach to patent law. 37 Whether
under the aegis of a global patent system, more coordination at the international
level will be important.

A number of areas of synchronization have been

identified as necessary: a uniform definition of patentable subject matter, uniform
filing and application procedures, uniform examination and grant procedures, and
uniform interpretation, remedies and enforcement. As noted, the United States is
moving towards a first to file system, though far from harmonized. An
implementation of a globally harmonized first to file system would allow American
inventors to file patent applications in English and supply a translated application
at a later time. This would help to eliminate the current race to submit patents in
foreign countries and the current dangers associated with translation errors in
foreign application and the difficulties of correction after submission.38 Similarly,
in Europe, continental harmonization faces various obstacles with the cost of
translating an application to obtain a patent. Translation costs and various fees,
is three to five times more expensive than a United States or Japanese patent.
Another major disadvantage in Europe is the lack of a Community Patent Appeal
Court, analogous to the federal Court of Appeals in the United States.39 A
harmonized patent system in Europe would allow the patent to issue in all
member states instead of the applicant having to choose the country of choice.

37

R.L. Campbell, “Global Patent Law Harmonization: Benefits and Implementation” (2003) 13 Ind.
Int‟l & Comp. L. Rev. 605 at 605 [Campbell]; A.R. Sommer, “Trouble on the Commons: A
Lockean Justification on Patent Law Harmonization” (2005) 87 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc‟y
141.
38
Campbell, ibid. at 623.
39
Ibid. at 625-27.
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The patent would be subject to one interpretation throughout the world, a central
court and administering body, and considerable reduction in translation costs.40
Another misconception when criticizing a global patent system seems to
be that technology is only generated in developed nations, rather than in
developing nations. Consequently, it is often presumed that „weak protection for
intellectual property will assist in obtaining developed country technology at little
or no cost.‟41 Intellectual property protection may help generate the development
of more technology in developing countries. Here, Mexico is cited as an example
where once its patent laws were reformed in 1991, large numbers of patents
were filed and were directly linked to contribute to local activity. 42 A similar
increase in technological development was seen in China in the late 1970s, when
the country reformed its legal and economic policies to foster its involvement in
the global economy.43 Also, consider that venture capital firms will not invest in
technology without some certainty that their technologies are protected44. And
from a university commercialization perspective, „[t]he expected synergy in these
research parks has not appeared at the levels observed in countries with highstimulation systems‟,45 which include patent protection. In reconciling the global
patent harmonization differences, one relevant policy question might be, to what
40

Ibid. at 627.
Ibid. at 629.
42
R. Sherwood, “Why a Uniform Intellectual Property System Makes Sense for the World” in M.B.
Wallerstein et al., eds., Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and
Technology (Washington: National Academy Press, 1993) 68 at 73
43
R.M. Gabriel, “The Patent Revolution; Proposed Reforms in Chinese Intellectual Property Law,
Policy, and Practice are the Latest Step to Bolster Patent Protection in China” 9(2) Asian-Pacific
Law & Policy Journal 323 at 328-330, online: University of Hawaii
<http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/articles/APLPJ_09.2_gabriel.pdf>.
44
Ibid. at 329.
45
J.F. Duffy “Patent System Reform: Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent law” (2002) 17
Berkeley Tech. L.J. 685.
41
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extent should interjurisdictional diversity and competition be sacrificed to achieve
global uniformity?46 John Duffy argues that uniformity makes laws unresponsive
to local variations, eliminates interjurisdictional competition and decreases
possibilities for legal experimentation.47 The speculated dangers here are that
with a uniform system the entire world would serve as a “laboratory” as
experiments would be spread out temporally and not geographically. This might
lead to decreased innovation and data outputs might be harder to interpret with
the lack of a good control.48 While these claims are at best speculative, local
diverse communities should not be completely outlawed for a single monolithic
code. Again, it is worth noting that such challenges are not isolated to patent or
intellectual property laws more broadly, but span most other legal systems.
At the same time, it is unrealistic to assume that a unitary patent system
will optimally encourage innovation in the wide range of diverse industries that it
is expected to cover. Indeed, the rules applied to different industries increasingly
diverge; some examples are found in biotechnology and computer software
cases where courts have diverged in applying common law legal standards of
obviousness, enablement and written description.49 Rather, as Dan Burk and
Mark Lemley argue it might be more opportune to enable courts to tailor patent
law to the needs of specific industries. Administrative agencies might also have a
role in shaping statutory applications. In Canada, the Canadian Intellectual

46

Ibid.
Ibid. at 685.
48
Ibid. at 691.
49
D.L. Burk & M.A. Lemley, “Policy Layers in Patent Law” (2003) 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575 at 1577-78;
J.C. Fromer, “Layers of Obviousness in Patent Law” (2008) 22 Harv. J. L. & Tech. 75, online:
SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1119723>.
47

D’Agostino December 19, 2011

18
Property Office, in the US, the Patent Trademark Office and, in the UK, the
Intellectual Property Office, each plays such a fundamental role.

2

Patent Administrative Offices – Peer-to-Patent Initiatives
There are mounting problems in the patent administration process and its

recalibration could present the most immediate and effective way to bolster the
viability of the patent system. As Peter Drahos argues, „[T]he vast majority of
patents begin and end their life in a patent office … It is the daily patent office
routines of a country that determine the build-up of patents in an economy,
including pharmaceutical patents.‟50 At the USPTO and the EPO, there is an
inordinate backlog of over a million patents to prosecute and patent examiners
spend less than 30 hours per application.51 Delays in patent examination are
problematic since applicants in the US for instance, will often specify other
countries in which they want to preserve their US filing date but delay filing in
these other jurisdictions until there is an outcome on the likelihood of patentability
of the invention. In theory, this would save applicants money so as to avoid
incurring needless expenses. But long delays in the examination process mean
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that “the time window for seeking international protection may close.‟52 In addition
to the substantial delays, patent examiners often lack the wide-ranging technical
expertise in reviewing the breadth of submitted applications. These limitations
are significant especially given that important decisions are made on whether to
grant 20 year monopolies for inventions that will shape the future of an industry
and fundamental research.53 Studies estimate that the deadweight loss of a
“loose” patent system from lost innovation is approximately $21 billion each year
in private costs alone, or nearly $200 per household per year. This sizeable
deadweight loss constitutes approximately 7% of annual R&D spending in the
United States.”54 And as pronounced in Graham v. John Deere Co.55 “. . . the
primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable material lies in the Patent
Office. To await litigation is, for all practical purposes, to debilitate the patent
system . . .”56 Third party submissions of prior art are increasingly rare because
there is (1) lack of awareness of published patent applications; (2) lack of
awareness of ability to submit prior art; (3) the inability to submit comments with
prior art; and (4) the presumption of validity if the patent issues.57 There is thus
an opportunity presented by the convergence of the publication of patent
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applications, internet communications, and the emergence of collaborative
communities.
Peer-to-Patent initiatives are a way to connect the scientific and innovative
arts communities to the patent examination process.58 The initiatives are
premised on the idea that a public of expert peers can help the patent examiner
find and analyse the “prior art” who ultimately can prosecute the patent more
comprehensively and efficiently. A web-based system connects public peers to
patent examiners. The US, the UK, Australia and Japan are leading the way on
this front.

From a patent applicant‟s perspective the benefits are various,

including the fact that it is cost-efficient, should result in stronger patents, and
reduces application waiting times.
The Institute for Information Law & Policy at New York Law School‟s work
is particularly noteworthy. The project which began in June 2007 has been driven
by consultative workshops, company and foundation support, professional and
student teams, USPTO cooperation and a steering committee and advisory
board. Its system is premised on simple communication of published patent
applications with the consent by participating (volunteer) patent applicants. The
system is based on an open, online review and comment system that takes place
over the course of four months. The best prior art references with comments are
forwarded to the examiner, who retains ultimate carriage of the file. Importantly,
the examination is advanced at the top of the examiner queue. The New York
Law School results have been positive as there has been enhanced patent
58
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system integrity, fewer unworthy patents, and greater confidence in issued
patents.59
In the first year of the pilot,60 71 applications were submitted by 17 unique
applicants with 173 prior art references.61 Of the 71 applications, 40 were
reviewed by experts, with 365 active reviewers taking part in the reviewing
process.62 The pilot was seen as a success, and in mid-July 2008, the USPTO
announced it would extend the pilot a second year until June 15, 2009. 63 The
second year of the pilot saw the number of applications increase from 71 in Year
One to 187 total applications at the end of May 2009.64 The number of unique
applicants increased from 17 to 73 in Year Two of the pilot, citing increased
press coverage and the USPTO expanding the eligible subject matter to include
patent applications pending in Class 705: Business Methods and E-Commerce.65
Furthermore, the number of active reviewers increased from 365 in Year One to
505 in Year Two, a 38 percent increase.66 Overall, the growth of the pilot was
very positive, and in October 2010, the USPTO and New York Law School jointly
announced a new pilot program commencing October 2010 and continuing
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through 30 September, 2011.67 Expectations are that the new pilot will draw more
success and a new review is currently underway to assess its results.
The success of the US initiative has led to similar pilots forming in other
areas of the world, including Japan, Australia and the United Kingdom. In Japan,
the Institute of Intellectual Property and Japan Patent Office began its pilot in the
summer of 2008 with help from the New York Law School, and there have been
over 40 patent applications submitted from 15 applicants, with 115 prior art
references.68 The success of the project led to the Institute of Intellectual
launching Peer to Patent Japan (P2PJ) in the beginning of 2011.69 The
Queensland University of Technology launched a six month P2P initiative in
December 2009 in conjunction with IP Australia and the New York Law School70.
As of December 2010, there have been 31 patent applications submitted from 18
applicants, with 106 prior art references.71 The UK Patent Office launched its
P2P pilot on 1 June, 2011.72
In the first review of the peer-to-patent pilot project, USPTO Director David
Kappos illuminated some of the progress with the program thus far.73 There has
been an increased interest in the program from innovators and university tech
transfer offices, many which have stated that peer-to-patent can help them to
67
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make early decisions regarding potentially costly patent prosecution. As
university research and development often involves “embryonic” technology, the
determination of patentability and market value to such emerging areas of
technology can often be quite difficult and expensive. However, peer-to-patent
can benefit tech transfer offices and private sector firms dealing with emerging
technologies as it allows them to rely on the information collected and reported
by peer-to-patent contributors when making investment decisions on the potential
market value of their patent applications. Kappos also stated that its review of the
pilot project shows that arts and technologies will receive the most benefit from
peer-to-patent.
The review also highlighted some early challenges, the most notable of
which would be in the scaling-up of the program. Kappos noted that many
businesses are reluctant to comment on others‟ patents for fear of willful
infringement claims by patentees. The review also found difficulty in finding
volunteers to submit prior art. While there were over 600 submissions of art, 37
applications in the pilot did not receive a single submission. Thus, there is a clear
challenge in scaling-up the program that would require on-going encouragement
of participation. One solution Kappos noted was drawn from the “open
innovation” model commonly used in software innovation. Such a model relies
upon a set of volunteer “knowledge possessors” who each contribute a certain
part in collaboration to create a complex program. Research has shown that an
important incentivizing factor in getting programmers involved is that of prestige,
as volunteer programmers are often known to each other. In applying this model
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to P2P, groups of technical professionals may enjoy competitive rounds of
submitting the best prior art or in demonstrating why a colleague‟s innovation is
patentable or not. Kappos also believes that by expanding the P2P program
dramatically, it would create market incentives for companies to invest in
submitting prior art on their competitors applications.
There is not much literature yet reviewing the peer-to-patent process.
Absent careful study (and more results, as the projects are still at their infancy),
only some speculative challenges can be recorded. Such pilot initiatives often
involve resources, and require buy-in from key stakeholders. Sometimes the very
issues that saddle the patent application process continue in the peer-to-patent
process. In Canada, for instance, while CIPO is interested in spearheading such
an initiative the bilingual language issue remains a challenge as all entries should
be in both French and English to ensure the integrity and transparency of the
process. Other issues involve the fact that the peer-to-patent process does
nothing to alter operation of the patent laws, which remain unquestioned (e.g. the
various standards of validity that may be seen as too weak to allow any patent
through). Also peer submissions may be made only strategically by various
parties, and might not be made if there is perceived fear of reproach by
competitors. Still, more information and transparency would be a welcome
ingredient in the patent examination process, especially given the need to make
patents as “valid” and attractive to incentive investment as possible.
Ultimately, something should be done to reform the patent administration
process. Whether it is a peer-to-patent model and/or one which shifts the
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examination burdens to the private sector, or increases responsibilities to the
heaviest users, various creative solutions remain ripe for exploration and further
study and action.74 There is no denying that more collaboration, which does not
necessarily mean uniformity, is necessary. And in terms of access to justice
issues, relying on patent litigation to eradicate invalid patents will not work for
weaker parties in either developed or developing countries.

3

Development of Resource-Friendly Innovation Centres

With the prohibitive costs surrounding the filing of patents, the need for more
resource-friendly alternatives for inventors and small businesses especially, is
integral to foster innovation. In North America, the development of student-run
commercialization clinics provide a low-cost alternative to these needy innovators
to support their patent applications.

In Canada, the Intellectual Property and Technology Law Program of
Osgoode Hall Law School (IP Osgoode) has partnered with the Ontario Centres
of Excellence Centre for Commercialization of Research (OCE-CCR) to create
the country‟s first student-run commercialization clinic, where Osgoode law
students will be matched up with OCE-supported companies to help them secure
and protect their intellectual property en route to commercial success.75 It is the
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first of its kind in Canada as it is built on a unique collaboration between a law
school and a proven, publicly-funded, innovation accelerator centre.
Launched in September of 2011, the twelve-month pilot program has
recruited six law students, the support of Osgoode IP professors and a wellestablished IP firm to oversee the legal work and assist on a variety of intellectual
property matters. The initiative initially focuses on patent law, but will eventually
cover all areas of intellectual property. The project serves as beneficial to both
the students and the inventors. The students invaluable legal training to foster
their development as young legal professionals, while the inventors receive highend intellectual property advice through a pro bono avenue that reduces start-up
costs. Although this is the first of its kind in Canada, the United States organized
a similar program a few years earlier. The USPTO began a pilot program in the
Fall 200876 involving six academic institutions in Phase One, and an additional
ten schools in phase two77. Similar to the IP Osgoode/OCE-CCR program, the
objective of the initiative was to provide students with a unique opportunity to
counsel innovators, artists, entrepreneurs, non-profit organizations and policy
makers on extensive ranges of intellectual property and business law issues. 78
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Such initiatives can assist inventors and smaller firms to develop their
technology at a cost that is more reasonable. The continual growth of such
initiatives will foster patentable technologies at all levels, thereby reducing some
of the barriers to entry faced by businesses with lower research and development
budgets.

D

Concluding Observations
So in the result, will, or should, we continue to have a patent system at

least in the form as we now know it? The literature seems to accept that
maintaining the current system is unavoidable, even if working to implement a
more global system. Some argue that the only system that can work is the one
that is currently in place. Even if a global system were to take shape, there would
have to be a section carved out that somehow keeps the good elements of the
system we have; diversity between nation states and industries is so substantial
that a unified system devoid of consideration for these differences would fail to
meet the inherent objective of serving the world community. There is no reason
to assume that a unitary patent system will optimally encourage innovation.
Ultimately, we should expect that the patent system meets the same objectives
of encouraging dissemination of scientific knowledge that has been its traditional
rationale, but much like the challenges, the solutions will be varied from the legal
to the more practical. Considerations of resources, administration, cultural and
social practices are important from the invention to the commercialization stage.
Any discussion of the patent system should have this greater context in mind and
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avoid rhetorical absolutism. In other words, challenges to the patent system
should be seen in this wider context and proposals for reform, within this more
pragmatic context.
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